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For people with synesthesia, sensations
in two modalities are experienced when
only one is stimulated (e.g., auditory
stimuli might trigger colors and sounds).
Synesthetes are manifestly different to
the general population, but can also be
different to each other. First, the con-
dition is widely heterogeneous in that
60–150 different manifestations of synes-
thesia have been identified (e.g., auditory
stimuli might trigger colors, shapes, flavors
and so on; Cytowic and Eagleman, 2009).
Second, synesthetes can differ on the qual-
ity of their synesthetic perceptions even
within a given variant. Some experience
their synesthetic percepts as being similar
in quality to a real-world perceptions (e.g.,
synesthetic colors might be projected onto
external objects and be difficult to disso-
ciate from real-world colors) while other
synesthetes experience less “veridical” per-
cepts (see below). In this opinion piece
I ask whether this particular difference—
known as the “projector” vs. “associa-
tor” distinction—might fall out naturally
from another, independent psychological
quality.
The projector/associator distinction
was first phrased (by Dixon et al., 2004)
in terms of grapheme-color synesthesia, in
which colors are triggered by letters and/or
digits. Some grapheme-color synesthetes
report that their colors are experienced
outside their own body space, projected
into the world, and these are termed
“projector” synesthetes. Ward and col-
leagues further divide this category into
two: “surface-projectors” experience color
projected onto the written type-face (or
more generally, onto the inducing stimulus
whatever that might be), and “space-
projectors” project color onto some other
externalized near-space. In contrast to
this external projection, other synesthetes
(termed “associators”) can be thought of
as “non-projectors” in that their colors
exist within their internal mental space.
Those associators who claim to see colors
in their mind’s eye have been termed “see-
associators,” while those who simply claim
to know the colors of graphemes without
any associated impression of “seeing” at
all have been termed “know-associators”
(Ward et al., 2007). In other words there
is a four-way divide between synesthetes
experiencing colors in a way resembling
real-world experiences (projected onto the
stimulus or into near-space) and those
experiencing them “internally” (in the
mind’s eye or as a type of propositional
association). The claim put forward in this
piece is a parsimonious one: that these
differences might emerge from an other-
wise unrelated individual difference, in the
ability to form a visual mental image.
Visual imagery—the mental construc-
tion of a scene-like object—is known to
vary across individuals (e.g., Marks, 1973).
At the upper extreme end there are indi-
viduals with “eidetic” imagery who report
strongly evoked mental images with an
almost veridical quality. At the opposite
end of the healthy spectrum are those who
report being unable to formmental images
at all. Taking these latter into considera-
tion, and assuming a prevalence of synes-
thesia of at least 4% (Simner et al., 2006),
we might assume—all other things being
equal—that 4% of people with poor or no
imagery abilities will have synesthesia. The
proposal here is that these individuals are
precisely those termed “know associators.”
Equally, those with extreme imagery abil-
ities might be those we recognise as pro-
jectors, because their high imagery allows
their synesthetic associations to become
“scene-like” to an extreme extent. Note
that this view (if it were correct) would rely
on the assumption that imagery and synes-
thesia are independent qualities and I now
compare this view with current thinking in
the literature.
Some researchers have proposed that
synesthetes are in fact characterized, as
a group, by superior mental imagery
(e.g., Barnett and Newell, 2008; Price,
2009a,b), and some have gone so far as
to ask whether some visual synesthesias
may be nothing more than extreme visual
imagery (Galton, 1880; Phillips, 1897;
Price, 2009a). One well-phrased expres-
sion of a possible link between synesthesia
and imagery is that normal cross-modal
sensations (say, between numbers and
space) may enter into consciousness only
if the individual has heightened imagery
(Eagleman, 2009; Price, 2009a), and this
is precisely when he/she would become
considered a “synesthete” (Simner, 2012).
(The resultant synesthesia in this exam-
ple would be sequence-space synesthesia—
in which sequences such as numbers are
consciously experienced in spatial arrays).
In contrast with this view, others have sug-
gested that synesthesia and imagery might
be quasi-independent in that synesthetes
might vary in their imagery ability, and
hence some could have relatively weak
imagery (see Grossenbacher and Lovelace,
2001, who put this view in passing).
Questions about synesthesia and
imagery have also been tested empiri-
cally. Barnett and Newell (2008) showed
that (n = 38) synesthetes with colored
language (e.g., grapheme-color synesthe-
sia) report significantly stronger vivid
everyday mental images than controls,
in a self-report questionnaire (Vividness
of Mental Imagery Questionnaire, VVIQ,
Marks, 1973). Meier and Rothen (under
review) show similarly for (n = 24)
grapheme-color synesthetes using the
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Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ;
Kirby et al., 1988). And the same has
been shown by Price (2009a) testing 12
sequence-space synesthetes, who outper-
formed controls in two questionnaires of
visual imagery (Subjective Use of Imagery
Scale, SUIS; Reisberg et al., 2003; and the
visual [but not spatial] component of
the Object–Spatial Imagery Questionnaire,
OSIQ; Blajenkova et al., 2006). However,
there has been some variation in the con-
sistency of this self-reported superiority in
imagery. Seron et al. (1992) failed to find
higher than average visual imagery in 26
sequence-space synesthetes, using Paivio’s
Individual Difference Questionnaire (IDQ;
Paivio, 1971). Furthermore, Spiller and
Jansari (2008) failed to find a group differ-
ence in the VVIQ between six grapheme-
color synesthetes and matched controls,
although this may be due to low power.
In addition to poor consistency across
synesthesia studies showing self-reported
superiority in imagery, there has also been
some variation in the extent to which
this has translated into behavioral sup-
port. Despite no self-reported differences,
grapheme-color synesthetes in Spiller and
Jansari (2008) out-performed controls on
a task that relied onmental imagery (imag-
ing a grapheme within a divided circle
and assessing which segment contained
the majority of that image). Another study
also found behavior suggesting synesthetes
have superior imagery (e.g., sequence-
space in 3D mental rotation; Simner et al.,
2009). However, their group size was small
(n = 5) and this effect was not replicated
in a larger sample of nine synesthetes with
a similar (sequence-space) variant (Rizza
and Price, 2012). Nonetheless, Simner
et al. tested somewhat unusual synesthetes
with an unusually large array of synes-
thetic forms (e.g., for minutes, hours,
days, months, numerals, letters, tempera-
ture etc.; mean = 7.0 forms; SD = 2.3).
In contrast, Rizza and Price’s subjects
required only two forms to be selected
for study. Superior performance in behav-
ioral imagery tasks might therefore be tied
to “superior” (more extreme) synesthe-
sia. Nonetheless, a superiority in men-
tal rotation for (n = 15) sequence-space
synesthetes has now also been replicated
by Brang et al. (2013; in 2D rotation),
although across all three studies, we must
conclude that the effect does not appear to
be robust enough to survive repeated repli-
cation, especially where synesthetes might
vary in their “strength.”
Finally, Spiller and Jansari found no
correlation between their self-reported
imagery scores and a behavioral visual
imagery task, suggesting that self-report
may not always reflect performance in lab-
based imagery tests. Furthermore, Rizza
and Price (2012) point out that mental
rotation has not previously correlated with
self-report in visual imagery, but rather
spatial imagery, even though synesthetes
do not report higher than average spatial
skills (Rizza and Price, 2012; Meier and
Rothen, under review). However, as Logie
et al. (2011; p. 3072) “subjective reports
[of mental imagery] do not always corre-
late with performance on mental imagery
tasks . . . [perhaps because] people have
poor insight into their mental operations
when rating them.”
From these somewhat conflicting
findings we can draw the following con-
clusions: although grapheme-color and
sequence-space synesthetes have reported
higher imagery in self-report visual
imagery questionnaires, this self-report
advantage has not been found consistently
across studies of grapheme-color synes-
thetes (e.g., Barnett and Newell, 2008 vs.
Spiller and Jansari, 2008 and Seron et al.,
1992) and nor has it consistently translated
into behavioral superiority for sequence-
space synesthetes in mental rotation (e.g.,
Simner et al., 2009; Brang et al., 2013 vs.
Rizza and Price, 2012). Furthermore, there
is conflict both across and within stud-
ies between the predictions of self-report
imagery questionnaires and behavioral
tests such as imaging graphemes (for
grapheme-color synesthetes; e.g., Spiller
and Jansari, 2008) and mental rotation
(for sequence-space synesthetes; e.g., Rizza
and Price, 2012 vs. Simner et al., 2009
and Brang et al., 2013). Where conflicts
arise across different cohorts of synesthetes
with the same variant, we might conclude
either that low power in some studies
may be to blame, or subtle differences in
methodologies, or indeed that meaningful
individual differences in imagery might
exist. In other words, if conflicts across
studies represent genuine differences in
imagery across synesthetes, then imagery
and synesthesia may be either partially or
fully independent.
If synesthesia and imagery are only
partially independent, we might conclude
that whatever causes synesthesia could
perhaps sometimes have repercussions for
high imagery, or vice versa, but that high
imagery is not a necessary component
of synesthesia. This would certainly be
compatible with findings in functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) that
synesthetic colors are experienced with at
least some differences in regions compared
to the colors within the mental imagery of
non-synesthetes (Rich et al., 2006). Partial
independence could also explain why some
synesthetes show no significant advan-
tage in tests/questionnaires of imagery: if
synesthesia and high imagery only tend to
be linked, some cases would exist where
the synesthete’s imagery was low. However
the tendency itself would also explain why
there is an overall trend toward finding
higher imagery across the body of litera-
ture as a whole (e.g., Barnett and Newell,
2008; Spiller and Jansari, 2008; Meier and
Rothen, under review).
But let us now consider the possibil-
ity that these skills may be fully indepen-
dent. If correct, this theory would smartly
explain why some studies find no imagery
advantages in their synesthetes. However,
it would also need to explain why some
synesthetes do score highly in imagery, and
perhaps more often than we might expect
by chance alone. Barnett and Newell
(2008) and others have suggested that high
imagery is a general characteristic of synes-
thesia but I would suggest it may simply
be a characteristic of those synesthetes that
self-report for testing. What then is dif-
ferent about these individuals? One con-
sistent quality of all participants in the
imagery studies reviewed here is that all
were fully aware of their synesthesia (hence
their self-referral and/or affirmations of
synesthesia), but importantly, this need
not be true of all synesthetes. It is reason-
able to propose that an individual’s aware-
ness of synesthesia might be heightened
if individual differences in imagery make
synesthetic colors highly image-able for
some synesthetes (but not others—who
instead might simply “know” their asso-
ciations at some propositional level). In
other words, I suggest that individual and
randomly dispersed variations in mental
imagery within the synesthesia population
would lead to some synesthetes having
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high imagery and therefore highly imaged
synesthetic colors. This in turn could lead
to enhanced conscious awareness, and
consequently a greater likelihood of self-
referral for scientific studies. This pro-
posal is in opposition to the view that
synesthetes overall are necessarily high
imagers as a sin qua non and/or that
synesthesia is nothing more than high
mental imagery. (Indeed, this same self-
referral argument might hold equally
over other hypotheses, such as whether
synesthetes have enhanced memory; e.g.,
Rothen et al., 2012).
In summary, I have proposed that
empirical evidence is currently equivocal
for synesthetes as high imagers. I have also
suggested that trends toward high imagery
in published studies might arise from a
recruitment bias in which high-imaging
synesthetes are more likely to self-refer. If
high imagery is neither sufficient nor nec-
essary for synesthesia, this would explain
why some studies fail to show superior
imagery, and would also nicely capture
why some synesthetes describe their colors
(or other sensations) as simply “known.”
Put differently, for those without the abil-
ity to form a mental image, there would be
no visual-like quality to their synesthetic
sensations. This theory would also explain
why other synesthetes do, in contrast,
describe their colors as highly imaged,
even eidetically so. My proposal sits along-
side another theory, by Ward et al. (2007),
that other differences within this same
spectrum (e.g., surface vs. near-space pro-
jectors) could also fall out naturally from
other a priori individual differences (this
time from differences in spatial reference
frames). In future studies it will be impor-
tant to establish whether trends found in
smaller populations are true even when
larger numbers are assessed. It is also
important to look at recruitment meth-
ods since self-referred samples might be
expected to show stronger imagery than
cohorts more randomly sampled. Finally,
future studies might seek a standardized
assessment of projector/associators, given
that previous efforts to classify individ-
uals have shown differences across labs
(c.f., Dixon et al., 2004; Ward et al., 2007)
and even over time (Edquist et al., 2006).
A useful classification would also extend
to all forms of synesthesia, including vari-
ants (e.g., sequence-space) in which the
projector/associator distinction has been
recognized thus far only in self-report.
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